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A. Introduction 
Developments in the realms of medicine and biotechnologies over the last few 
decades have enabled the application of techniques that until recently were 
unthinkable1. Surrogate motherhood is one such approach, whereby the concept of 
biological motherhood is essentially challenged2. When it comes to Medically 
Assisted Reproduction methods, surrogate motherhood, along with post-mortem 
fertilization and reproductive cloning, have come to be the most controversial issues. 
Sweden has been the first country worldwide to adopt ad-hoc legislation to regulate 
Medically Assisted Reproduction3. More specifically, the first legislative approach in 
                                                 
1 A contrario, cf. K. Panagos, Παρένθετη μητρότητα: ελληνικό νομικό καθεστώς και 
εγκληματολογικές προεκτάσεις (Surrogacy: Greek legal framework and criminal effects in Δίκαιο & 
κοινωνία στον 21ο αιώνα (Law and Society in the 21st Century) Law Review, Sakkoulas Editions, 
Athens – Thessaloniki, 2001, p.28 et seq. This scholar has been invoking examples to corroborate his 
assertion that “substitution in motherhood is nothing novel”. 
2 See, I. Deligiannis, «Η επίδραση των νέων μεθόδων τεχνητής αναπαραγωγής του ανθρώπου στη 
διαμόρφωση του ελληνικού δικαίου της συγγένειας», (The influence of new methods of artificial 
human reproduction on the development of the Law of Kinship in Greece) in Armenopoulos Law 
Review  Αρμ 1995, p. 281; E. Kounougeri – Manoledaki, Family Law, Vol. II, Sakkoulas Editions, 
Athens-Thessaloniki, 2012, p. 46; V. Petoussi – Ntouli, «Δικαιϊκή ρύθμιση της υποβοηθούμενης 
αναπαραγωγής: Σκέψεις για την ομοιότητα, τη διαφορά και την ισότητα (Legislative regulation of 
assisted reproduction: Considerations on similarities, differences and equality), in Θέματα Βιοηθικής, 
(Bioethical Issues), Creta University Press, Herakleion, 2013, p. 303 et seq. 
3 The originality of the Swedish approach mainly consisted in the institution of the right of offspring 
born through donated gametes, to become informed of the identity of the donor, a fact considered to be 
unique and as revolutionary. Ever since, more legal orders have adopted relevant laws, fashioned after 
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this field, in Sweden, has been the Insemination Act (1984:1140), entered 
into effect in 1985. In that particular legislative text there had been no specific 
provision on surrogate motherhood. The law has understandably since been amended 
and complemented on more than one occasions4 over the following years. Still, 
despite all the amending acts and complementary laws5, surrogate motherhood in 
Sweden continues not to be directly regulated. 
B. The current legislative framework 
In 2006 there was introduced in Sweden the Genetic Integrity Act (GIA) 
(2006:351), meant to substitute all previous laws in the matter. This particular piece 
of legislation, still in effect today, did not in any way change things with respect to the 
                                                                                                                                            
the Swedish model. See E. Ekerhovd/A.Faurskov/Ch. Werner, ‘‘Swedish sperm donors are driven by 
altruism, but shortage of sperm donors leads to reproductive travelling’’, Uppsala Journal of Medical 
Sciences, 2008; 113 (3), p. 305, C. Gottlieb/O. Lalos/F. Lindblad, ‘‘Disclosure of donor insemination to 
the child: the impact of Swedish legislation on couples’ attitudes’’, Human Reproduction, 2000, vol. 15 
no 9, p. 2052, S. Isaksson/A. SkoogSvanberg/G. Sydsjö/A. Thurin-Kjellberg/P.-O. Karlström/N.-G. 
Solensten/C. Lampic, ‘‘Two decades after legislation on identifiable donors in Sweden: are recipient 
couples ready to be open about using gamete donation?’’, Human Reproduction, 2011, vol 26, no 4, p. 
853 et seq., Α. Lalos/K. Daniels/C. Gottlieb/Ο. Lalos, ‘‘Recruitment and motivation of semen providers 
in Sweden’’, Human Reproduction, 2003, vol. 18 no 1, p. 212, A. Lalos/ C. Gottlieb/ O. Lalos, 
‘‘Legislated right for donor-insemination children to know their genetic origin: a study of parental 
thinking’’, Human Reproduction, 2007, vol. 22 no 6 p 1759-1768, p. 1759, J. Stoll, Swedish donor 
offspring and their legal right to information, Uppsala, 2008, p. 42 et seq., F. Linldblad/C. Gottlieb/O. 
Lalos, ‘‘To tell or not to tell – what parents think about telling their children that they were born 
following donor insemination’’, J PsychosomObstetGynecol 2000:21, p. 193 et seq. 
4 L. Hamberger/M. Wikland, ‘‘Reproductive care policies around the world – Regulation and results 
concerning assisted reproduction in Sweden’’, Journal of Assisted Reproduction and Genetics, 1993, 
Vol. 10, No. 4 1993, p. 243 et seq., J. Lind, ‘‘The best interest of the child as an argument in 
assessments of parent potential in Sweden’’, International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family, 2008, 
(22), 1, 1-21, p. 15, Nordic Committee on Bioethics, Dr. Riitta Burrell (dir.), Assisted Reproduction in 
the Nordic Countries, TemaNord 2006:505, p. 17 et seq., E. Rynning, ‘‘Legal Aspects of Human-
Animal Chimeras and Hybrids: Country Report Sweden’’, in CHIMBRIDS ─ Chimeras and Hybrids in 
Comparative European and International Research (eds. J. Taupitz& M. Weschka),. Springer Publishing 
House, 2009, Berlin, p. 764-781, J. Stoll, Swedish donor offspring and their legal right to information, 
Uppsala, 2008, p. 42 et seq., The Swedish National Council on Medical Ethics, Assisted reproduction – 
ethical aspects (Summary of a report), 2013, p. 2 et seq., Swedish Association of Local Authorities and 
Regions (SALAR), Survey and County Council Services, November 2012 – Version 2, p. 11 et seq., 
White & Case LLP, European Laws governing in in vitro fertilization, 25/2/2009. 
http://www.federa.org.pl/dokumenty_pdf/invitro/jbf_European_laws_governing_in_vitro_fertilization
%5B2%5D.pdf, p. 25 et seq 
5 Here are the main pieces of legislation passed in the matter of Medically Assisted Reproduction in 
Sweden: 
1988  Act on In-Vitro Fertilization (1988:711), allowing for in-vitro fertilization. 
1991  Act on the Use of Certain Genetic Technologies in Medical Screening (1991:114) and Act on 
Measures for Purposes of Research or Treatment using Fertilized Human Eggs (1991:115), regulating 
issues relevant to research in oocytes and embryos. 
2003  In the wake of the adoption of Draft Law 2001/02:89 submitted by the Swedish Ministry of 
Health it became possible for eggs to be donated. 
2005 Clearance of a conditional creation of embryos for research purposes. 
2005  In the wake of final adoption of the modifications brought about by the Draft Law on Assisted 
Fertilization and Parenthood (2004/05:137) submitted by the Swedish Ministry of Justice, female 
homosexual couples were allowed access to Medically Assisted Reproduction methods. 
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technique of surrogate motherhood6. Swedish legislators seem to be avoiding to 
explicitly allow or restrict the implementation of this particular method. 
More specifically, Article (3) of Chapter (7) of the GIA (2006:351) stipulates 
that “… a fertilized egg may be introduced into a woman’s body only if the woman is 
married or cohabiting and the spouse or cohabitee gives written consent to this. If the 
egg is not the woman’s own, the egg shall have been fertilized using the husband’s or 
cohabitee’s sperm”. 
The very formulation of this Article leads to the obvious assertion that in-vitro 
fertilization may only be applied when either of the future parents is genetically 
connected to the child. Consequently, from the moment that either the woman 
destined to bear the child or her spouse / cohabitee has obligatorily to be one of the 
child’ s  future parents, such provision essentially prohibits in-vitro fertilization in a 
surrogate motherhood context. 
C. The establishment of kinship 
1)There can be no doubt as to the multitude of legal issues - mostly relevant to 
the establishment of kinship between the child and the parents aspiring at the 
conception of the latter - occurring as a result of the Genetic Integrity Act (GIA) 
(2006:351) not regulating the concept of surrogate motherhood. 
At this point, it is worth observing that, under the Swedish legislation, the 
establishment of kinship on the side of the mother is governed by the principle of 
“mater semper certa est”7. Otherwise said, the woman having given birth to the child 
shall also be legally deemed to be the mother, irrespective of the latter’s intention to 
ultimately hand the child over to the social parents8. Even in the case of the genetic 
material originating from the mother aspiring at having a child, the latter, legally 
speaking, has no parental right towards the child to which she is nevertheless 
biologically connected, hence the need for the adoption procedure to be followed.
 Similarly, legally speaking, it is the spouse of the woman having given birth to 
the child – i.e., in the case of surrogate motherhood, the spouse of the woman having 
                                                 
6 Be it noted for the record that legislation in Sweden in the matter of Medically Assisted Reproduction 
is being constantly complemented and refined by way of relevant Regulations and Guidelines. 
7 M. Witkowsky, Giving Birth. Debating Surrogate Motherhood in Sweden, A Question of Equality, p. 
10. 
8 J. Stoll, Surrogacy Arrangements and Legal Parenthood, Swedish Law in a Comparative Context, p. 
120. 
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borne the child - that is considered to be the child’ s father. This 
presumption is rebuttable if no genetic material of such spouse was utilized, provided 
the spouse claims not to have consented to a Medically Assisted Reproduction 
procedure. Moreover, if third-party fertilized egg is involved, the spouse may 
challenge fatherhood of the child if he is in a position to bring in evidence of his not 
having consented to a Medically Assisted Reproduction procedure. 
In order for the persons intending to have a child to be formally acknowledged 
as such child’s legal parents, the commissioning mother shall have to adopt the child 
whereas the commissioning father shall be expected to go through the so-called 
“confirmation” procedure – provided he has supplied his own genetic material for the 
conception. Such “confirmation” procedure is applied irrespective of the biological 
father being in a heterosexual union or in a homosexual union or if the father is living 
alone. 
2) Despite such gap in the law, however, there are always children born 
through such method. Still, because of surrogate motherhood not being practiced in 
public hospitals, many Swedish couples either go abroad or take recourse to the 
application of such method privately, in Sweden. As a consequence, offspring born 
through such procedures are found themselves in a legally precarious condition since 
the establishment of kinship to persons having aspired at their birth – i.e. the social 
parents – does not happen upon the offspring’s birth whereas there have to take place 
certain legal actions, which in turn often creates problems. Typical of such eventuality 
are two court rulings, namely: (a) the ruling issued on the of  7th of July 20069 by the 
Supreme Court in Case Ö 5154-04 and (b) a ruling issued  by the Appellate Court of 
Gothenburg10 on 27-5-2014 in Case No. 5568-13 Dok.Id 285610. 
In Case Ö 5154-04 (in the matter of which a ruling was handed down on the 
7th of July 2006), a married couple unable to have children decided, in 2006, to take 
recourse to the method of surrogate motherhood. To such purpose, they came to an 
arrangement with the husband’s sister, who agreed to bear the child for them. Both 
members of the married couple supplied their genetic material whereas the husband’s 
sister rendered herself to Finland, underwent a Medically Assisted Reproduction 
                                                 
9 NJA, 2006, s 505. 
10 Cf. Relevant legal data base at zeteo, http://www.sub.su.se/start/sok.aspx 
                Kalliopi Kipouridou – Maria Milapidou                                                                                        
 
135 
process and eventually became pregnant with a child that was in due time born in 
Sweden. 
Despite the fact that both social parents of the child nurtured the latter and the 
father having exclusive parental care rights over the child, legally speaking it was the 
father (husband of the social couple) and his sister (surrogate mother) that were 
considered to be the parents of the child. 
Upon the child reaching the age of one year, the social mother applied for 
adoption, in an effort to also be granted parental care of the child and eventually 
obtain the status of legal mother. 
The relevant request was sustained by the District Court in 2004. Subsequently 
to that, however, the social father and his sister (i.e. the surrogate mother) withdrew 
their consent to the adoption, upon which the social father took recourse before the 
Court of Appeals, requesting that the application for adoption of the child, originally 
filed by his wife, be rejected on the grounds of his having withdrawn his consent to 
such adoption, which in turn made it impossible for the adoption to be confirmed. 
The Court of Appeals rejected the request for adoption which in turn 
compelled the social mother to take recourse to the Cassation Court of that country, 
where the appellate ruling was eventually confirmed by a majority vote of 3/2, 
arguing that the withdrawal of the consent to the adoption had been valid as well as 
that there was no possibility for an adoption to be allowed unless both legal parents 
have consented thereto. According to the Court, the fact of the social mother also 
being the child’s genetic mother did not in any way alter the sine-qua-non 
requirement of an unequivocal consent thereto by both legal parents. 
Just as interesting are the provisions of the 27-5-2014 Ruling by the Court of 
Appeals of Gothenburg11 (Case No. 5568-13 Dok.Id. 285610) in that they touch upon 
a series of more specific issues stemming from the lack of legislative regulation of the 
concept of surrogate motherhood. 
In said case, Mr. J.L. had a child through a surrogate mother from India. He 
took action against his social security fund before the Administrative Tribunal of 
Malmö, requesting that financial assistance be also granted in connection with the 
                                                 
11 Cf. Relevant legal data base at zeteo, http://www.sub.su.se/start/sok.aspx 
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child, given that under the circumstances it was impossible to seek 
alimony from the child’s surrogate mother. 
J.L’s allegation was that the child should be awarded financial support on the 
grounds of the latter needing to be spared any discriminatory treatment in comparison 
to other children which, when not entitled to alimony by the parent not having 
custody over them (if proven that the parent not having custody is not in a position to 
meet this particular financial burden) are to receive such funds from the State. What 
J.L. essentially argued, therefore, was that the child’s legal status under the 
circumstances is similar to the status the child would have had, had the latter been 
adopted by J.L. alone. Whereas an agreement had been entered between the two 
parents, according to which the father alone would be in charge of the child, under the 
Swedish law a biological parent may not decline payment of alimony for the child, 
hence the entitlement to request assistance from the competent social security fund. 
Put in a nutshell, the allegations by the social security fund may be resumed in that 
when it comes to having a child through a surrogate mother, it is presumed that the 
person having had such child also undertake the entire expense for the latter’s 
maintenance, hence the impossibility of any claim of the kind been raised against such 
person’s social security fund. 
The Court of Appeals eventually sustained the appellate recourse lodged by 
the father, holding that the social security fund is under the obligation of protecting 
the child, hence the need for the Court to enter anew into the merits of the case, all the 
more since there had been no possibility for the father to be pressed towards looking 
for the surrogate mother and eventually seek alimony for the child. 
D. The criterion of the child’s best interest 
The circumstances set forth above are downright irreconcilable with the fact 
that under the Swedish legislation in the matter of Medically Assisted Reproduction, 
the child’ s best interest is meant to be given the utmost priority. Whatever actions are 
taken should therefore be inspired by such interest, this being also an “assessment 
criterion” as to the acceptability of the various methods of Medically Assisted 
Reproduction. More specifically: 
According to Article (3) of Chapter (6) of the GIA (2006:351), prior to 
insemination, the MD in charge shall have to assess whether the social and 
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psychological circumstances of the spouses / cohabitees justify the procedure. 
Insemination shall only start once it has been plausibly established that the 
prospective child may be brought up under favorable conditions. 
The same applies under Article (5) of Chapter (7) of the GIA (2006:351) in the 
matter of heterologous in-vitro fertilization. 
Special mention is at this point to be made of Article (2) of Chapter (6) of the 
Children and Parents Code, stipulating that the child’s best interest has to be 
considered as the most critical of all criteria by reference to which to determine – in 
the light of the specific provisions of that particular Chapter – whatever issues 
relevant to custody, residence and communication. In order to assess what it is that 
serves a child’s interests best, special focus is to be placed upon the child’s need for 
close and positive contacts with both parents. The risk for the child to be physically 
abused, kept deliberately away, illegally confined or otherwise suffer damages is to be 
very seriously considered. 
Despite all, children born through surrogate motherhood are de facto in a less 
advantageous position compared to children born naturally or by use of other 
reproductive technology methods, as in the former case, there has also to intervene an 
adoption or a “confirmation” procedure for parent rights to be confirmed for the child’ 
social parents. 
In the light of such primacy granted to the child’s best interest, over the 
interests of any other party whatsoever (namely of the woman having actually born 
the child and the social parents thereof), one is therefore righteously given to some 
wondering as to the ways whereby such interest is served in case of birth through this 
particular technique. 
E. Conclusions 
In view of the considerations set forth above, the consistent reluctance on the 
part of the legislator in Sweden to regulate the practice of surrogate motherhood in 
this country is definitely odd. Social reality in Sweden nevertheless suggests that such 
method is essentially practiced either abroad or – if within Swedish territory – 
privately. In a legal order like that of Sweden, with laws uncompromisingly benefiting 
the child, an absence of regulation of the legal circumstances arising from recourse to 
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this particular method of Medically Assisted Reproduction places the child 
to be born through such technique in a disadvantageous position. 
The Swedish legislation ought therefore to ponder whether, in the effort to 
scorn the conduct of those couples who choose to take recourse to surrogate 
motherhood in contempt of the indirect / inferred prohibition to do so, it is the child 
born by a surrogate mother who is ultimately punished, to the extent that the 
precarious legal status they face is definitely not to the best of their interest. 
 
